The Naval War Code by Woolsey, Theodore S.
COL UMBIA LA W -RE VIEW.
THE NAVAL WAR CODE.
T HE code of "Instructions for the. government of the
armies of the United States in the field," drawn up by
Professor Lieber and issued as General Order 1oo, in 1863,
in some sense marked an epoch in the history of the rules
of land warfare. It was a set of rules, humane and enlight-
ened for the times, covering the ground broadly, expressed
clearly and in codified form, while the rules of other pow-
ers lacked this definiteness and depended too much upon
the impulse of the commander. Upon this code as a basis,
it is not too much to say that all subsequent codes have
been built up, whether official or unofficial, adopted or
rejected, the work of a single writer, of a commission of
publicists or of a conference of the powers.
Last June there was issued by the Navy Department of
the United States a code of the "Laws and Usages of War
at Sea," prescribed for the guidance of the naval service
by General Order 551, which is comparable in all particu-
lars with the land code of thirty-seven years ago. Drawn
up by Captain C. H. Stockton, it, too, is enlightened and
specific, and like Lieber's Code, in scope and comprehen-
siveness is the first in the field. May it not likewise serve
as a model and foundation for other codes of other powers,
and thus help in the great work of unifying the laws of
war?
Although Captain Stockton's Code is too long to be
printed and discussed in full in the pages of this REVIEW, I
have hoped that its readers might be interested in some of
its more noticeable and debatable features, with occasional
comparison with the rules of other navies. No authorita-
tive statement of the latter, covering the same field, is to be
had, however. Information as to their rules must be gath-
ered from instructions for special occasions, from regula-
tions as to particular service, from the manuals of text
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writers not in codified form nor officially adopted, and from
the formal works of the publicists.'
SECTION I.
Article i.-The code begins with a novel and interesting
statement of the special objects of maritime war. These
are:
" The capture or destruction of the military and naval
forces of the enemy; of his fortifications, arsenals, drv docks
and dockyards; of his various military and naval establish-
ments, and of his maritime commerce; to prevent his pro-
curing war material from neutral sources; to aid and assist
military operations on land, and to protect and defend the
national territory, property and sea-borne commerce."
Two facts are here clearly shown. One is that, what-
ever the policy of the State Department may be, looking
towards the exemption of an enemy's innocent property on
sea from capture (which was the Marcy idea in 1856), the
navy clings to the unquestionable right to prey upon an
enemy's commerce. This has been our own usage from
the birth of the Republic, except as surrendered by treaty
with Italy in 1871. It is the usage of other maritime pow-
ers. Protection from similar attack on the part of an enemy
is part of the duty of the United States Navy. All this is
in accordance with the ancient rule, consistently adhered
to down to the present time. Clearly if this rule is to be
abrogated in the interest of innocent commerce, the move-
ment must be initiated by some body other than a naval
department. Even the International Law Associations are
not ready to recommend so sweepihg a change.
The other "special object" to which attention is called
is the prevention of an enemy from procuring war material
from neutral sources. This is a plain admission of a princi-
ple perfectly well understood, that the suppression of con-
traband trade rests on the shoulders of the belligerent who
would be injured, and not on the neutral government. The
I For purposes of comparison with earlier ,rules of naval warfare, the
writer has been obliged to content himself with Snow's Manual for the U.
S. A., Lushington's Naval Prize Law for Great Britain, the Instructions to
the French Navy at the Outset of the War of 1870, printed in Snow's
Cases, and with the treatises upon International Law, of various national-
ities.
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recent inquiry in Congress into the sale of horses and
mules to the British Government for use in South Africa,
shows that this admission is not so unnecessary as might be
thought.
Article 2 describes the area of maritime warfare, which
comprises all waters not neutral. This made it essential to
define the extent of coast sea over which the neutral has
jurisdiction.
" The territorial waters of a state extend seaward to the
distance of a marine league from the low-water mark of its
coast line."
This is one more proof of the wide-spread recognition
of three miles as the extent of a state's coast sea. * Lushing-
ton gives the British rule thus : " The territorial waters of
a state are the waters within three miles of any part of her
territory." But the instructions for the French Navy pre-
scribe the other rule : " Vous considirerez les eaux ter-ito-
riales comme c'etendant e une porthe de canon au-deld de la
laisse de basse mer." And the Germans incline to the same
theory. The difficulty with a cannon-shot distance to
measure the width of coast sea, instead of an arbitrary
three-mile zone, is that it is not exact. It would vary with
every gun, with every new invention, with every year.
Some conventional distance is necessary, therefore ; it mat-
ters little what. But as three miles are specific, and more
widely accepted than any other measurement, it is well
that our code should cling to them as the proper limit of a
State's jurisdiction.
In Articles 3 and 4 attention is directed to the following
rule, expressed first in general terms, and afterwards more
specifically :
" Non-combatants are to be spared in person and prop-
erty during hostilities, as much as the necessities of war
and the conduct of such non-combatants will permit."
"The bombardment by a naval force of unfortified and
undefended towns, villages or buildings is forbidden, except
where such bombardment is incidental to the destruction
of military or naval establishments, public depots of muni-
tions of war, or vessels of war in port, or unless reasonable
requisitions for provisions and supplies essential at the time
to such naval vessel or vessels are forcibly withheld, in
which case due notice of bombardment shall be given. The
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bombardment of unfortified and undefended towns and
places for the non-payment of ransom is forbidden."
The rules of the Hague Conference governing land war-
fare, forbid the bombardment of undefended places un-
equivocally. The rules of the Navy Department here
quoted permit it where supplies are forcibly withheld, that
is as a penalty for failure to furnish a ship of war with what
it wants, coal, for instance. This would seem to be new
ground. Neither do the rules of other navies, nor the text
writers take up this exact question. The prohibition of
bombardment for non-payment of ransom shows the inten-
tion of the code to be humane. Under these circumstances
it may be cjuestioned whether the exception noted is justi-
fiable. Would not the proper procedure be to send a land-
ing party to requisition needed supplies? Then if resist-
ance is made and "supplies forcibly withheld," the town is
not "undefended "; it may be seized and the ship's needs
satisfied. But bombardment is so undiscriminating, so de-
structive a method, as to be out of all proportion to the
nature of the offense which it is designed to punish. It is
just this readiness to destroy innocent property in order to
exert pressure that has prejudiced the minds of many
against naval methods. The practice of destruction is
neither a proper substitute for a landing party and taking
possession in war, nor for diplomatic settlement in peace.
The language of the code is also too indefinite. It speci-
fies "reasonable requisitions " for "essential supplies," both
conditions to be judged of by the ship's chief officer. The
sentiment of to-day would surely agree with Lawrence,
in the wish that " open and undefended places should
not be bombarded at all." The usage of to-day has
not declared itself in the matter under discussion. The
analogy of land warfare and the code's own prohibition of
bombardment to collect contributions both seem opposed
to it. We conclude, therefore, that this rule is to be re-
gretted as one of the few points in the code open to crit-
icism.
The next topic of the code treats of submarine cables
in war. It will be remembered that in the international
I Page 443.
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treaty of 1884 for the protection of submarine cables, Arti-
cle XV, it is expressly laid down that "the stipulations ot
this Convention shall in no wise affect the liberty of action
of belligerents," and the United States Navy in the Spanish
war cut them freely. What the aforesaid "liberty of ac-
tion'" means, the code undertakes to lay down. It divides
(Art. 5) submarine cables into three classes: Those between
enemy's points or between the United States and hostile
territory; between neutral territory and an enemy; between
neutral points. The first, irrespective of ownership, are
"subject to such treatment as the necessities of war may
require." The second "may be interrupted within the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the enemy." The third shall be in-
violable. This is all reasonable and good. Of course it
was not the province of the Navy Department to speak of
damages for cutting cables, nor is the belligerent's liability
clear. The damage is two-fold, from destruction of plant
and from interruption of traffic. The first is usually a
mere break and easily repaired. The second can in many
cases be lessened by military control and a censorship.
Liability for damage resulting from these causes has not
been discussed by text writers, nor determined in the courts
or by negotiation as yet, so far as I am aware. If the anal-
ogy of land telegraph wires and railway lines, leading from
neutral to enemy's territory, were followed, it would seem
that the rules should forbid wanton destruction, permit mil-
itary use, admit liability for damage, to be settled after the
war, and require restitution of neutral plant as soon as
necessity permitted.' But the analogy is not a perfect one,
and the feasibility of continued commercial use under mil-
itary censorship tends to make complete stoppage of busi-
ness less excusable.
Somewhat similar is the neutral's right to indemnity in
case of seizure of his vessels on the ground of military
necessity, which the next article (6) rules upon:
" If military necessity should require it, neutral vessels
found within the limits of belligerent authority may be
seized and destroyed or otherwise utilized for military pur-
l Hague Convention, Art. 53 and 54: "et les indemnitgs seront rggles
. ]a paix-."
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poses, but in such cases the owners of neutral vessels must
be fully recompensed."
This is thejus angariw. An illustration would be the seiz-
ure and sinking in the Seine of six English vessels in I870
by the Germans to bar the ascent of the river by French
gunboats. The Germans excused their act on the ground
of pressing military necessity, and paid for the property-de-
stroyed. They are said, however, to have suggested that
since it was the menace of French gunboats which necessi-
tated the deed, the claim for damages should properly lie
against France rather than Germany.
Article 7:
"The use of false colors in war is forbidden, and when
summoning a vessel to lie to, or before firing a gun in ac-
tion, the national colors should be displayed by vessels of
the United States."
Just what is and what is not good form in the deception
of one's enemy it is puzzling for the civilian to guess. In
land warfare you may not make improper use of the ene-
my's flag or uniform, but you "may employ ruses of war,
and circulate false information ", So Lushington2 says:
"A commander may chase, but under no circumstances
may fire, under false colors."
Ortolan, himself a French naval officer, permits false
colors until the fight opens. Calvo allows them for escape,
but never for attack. Thus the rule of the code is an ad-
vance upon the usage of other States; it is also an improve-
ment upon our own earlier usage, which, as stated in
Snow's Manual for the use of the United States Navy (page
92), permitted the use of a foreighi flag to deceive an enemy
but hauled it down before a gun was fired.
SECTION II.-BELLIGERENTS.
The section entitled " Belligerents" defines lawful com-
batants on sea, the Naval Militia and Reserve, for instance,
distinguishes non-combatants and prescribes the treatment
of both. Attention is directed to but one article here,
No. II:
1 Hague Cony., 23, 24.
2 Rule 17.
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" The Personnel of a merchant vessel of an enemy cap-
tured as a prize can be held, at the discretion of the
captor, as witnesses or as prisoners of war, when, by train-
ing or enrolment, they are immediately available for the
naval service of the enemy, or they may be released from
detention or confinement."
Here the question is whether individuals in the crew of an
enemy merchantman can be properly held as prisoners, as the
code permits. The present usage of naval warfare undoubt-
edly allows this, and does not condition it, as the code does.
But it may be questioned whether this is not a severity
which reason and humanity unite in discouraging. The
reason given in justification of the present rule is that
certain seamen are fit " for immediate use on ships
of war "1 So, if a hostile army invaded France or
Germany, would every peasant be fit for immediate use
in war because he had once served under the colors? It
would seem that the distinction between combatants and
non-combatants should be one of fact, not one of a possible
intention. Here are enemy's subjects engaged in an inno-
cent occupation, having no relation to war. There is no
proof of a wish to serve on a warship. Service on the mer-
chantman is evidence to the contrary. The sending of
their ship to a hostile port for adjudication further removes
the crew from likelihood of service. Why should imprison-
ment be added to the hardship of capture and loss of wages
and the suffering of those dependent? This is not finding
fault with our Naval Code-that follows usage. We merely
suggest this as a desirable innovation-humane, rational
and by no means dangerous.
SECTION III. -BELLIGERENT AND NEUTRAL VESSELS.
Section III, on Belligerent and Neutral Vessels, reflects
the best modern usage. It exempts from capture "coast
fishing vessels innocently employed," following the decision
of the Supreme Court in the case of the Spanish smacks
Paquete Habana and Lola2 rendered in January, 19co.
It allows the destruction of an enemy's merchantmen in
case of necessity. Such excuse for scuttling or burning a
' Hall, 2d Ed., p. 369.
2 I75 U. S. 677.
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ship instead of sending in for trial would be inability to
spare a prize crew, unseaworthiness, want of an open port.
But in such case a survey and inventory must be taken and
lodged with the Prize Court.
Article 15 allows free passage to the merchant vessels of
an enemy sailing from a United States port prior to the
declaration of war, unless engaged in guilty traffic. The
same in port are given thirty days to load and sail. And
enemy's ships bound for our ports before the outbreak of
war may enter, discharge cargo and proceed to any port not
blockaded. President McKinley's proclamation of April
26, 1898, exemplified this usage.
The violation of neutrality involved in an increase of
armament or crew in a neutral port is forbidden.
The neutral flag covers enemy's goods, showing that,
although not a party to the Declaration of Paris of 1856,
and not entitled to its benefits, the United States yet is
bound by its rules.
The final rule in this section recalls the later usage of
the Civil War. Neutral mail steamers bearing hostile de-
spatches as the ordinary business of a mail carrier
"are not liable to seizure and should not be detained, ex-
cept upon clear ground of suspicion of a violation of the
laws of war with respect to contraband, blockade or un-
neutral service, in which case the mail bags must be for-
warded with seals unbroken."
SECTION IV.
We come next in Section IV to the regulations affecting
hospital ships. It will be remembered that the rules of
1868, to extend the Geneva Convention to naval war, were
not ratified by the signatories. This matter was taken up
at the Hague in 1899 and a convention agreed upon, which
the United States Senate ratified on May 4, 19oo. The
rules thus adopted are, therefore, binding upon the navy,
and we should expect to have them incorporated into its
code. In great part they have been, and presumably would
have been in whole, but for the fact that the code, issued
June 27, 19oo, must have been in press when the conven-
tion was ratified. The omission relates to the authorization
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of neutral hospital ships. At the conference the status of
men picked up by these was called in question. Were they
to escape under the protection of the neutral flag, as so
many of the crew of the Alabama did, picked up by the
English yacht Deerhound off Cherbourg? Or should they
be handed over to the victor or set ashore on parole? This
was Captain Mahan's main stumbling block in committee,
and this prevented his signing the Convention with the
rest. He had urged that no neutral hospital ships should
be licensed, that all such offering aid should bear the flag of
and be subject to one belligerent or the other. The code
bears the stamp of his objections. It exempts from capture
public and private ships of either combatant, licensed and
fitted for hospital service. They shall give relief without
regard to nationality, must take their chances in an engage-
ment, are under orders to the fleet with which they unite and
must be clearly marked white with a red strake. Then a third
,class of vessels is authorized to do similar work-merchant-
men, yachts or neutral vessels near by. These may gather
up the wounded, but shall then report "to the belligerent
commander controlling the waters thereabouts," and can-
not carry off the rescued men without permission. All
rescued sick and wounded are thus to be considered pri-
soners of war, and may be sent to their own, to a neutral or
to the enemy's country as the controlling power wills, with
the condition of no further service in that war.
These three classes of licensed vessels are copied from
the Hague Convention. The additional class which that
includes, but which the code omits, consists of hospital
ships "equipped in whole or in part at the expense of
neutral individuals, or of societies officially known."
These are to be respected and exempted from capture,
if the neutral power to which they belong has commis-
sioned them, and given their names to the belligerents.
Whether the American objection to this provision is
justified or not, the provision itself is apparently now obli-
gatory. And certainly, compared with the value of the
whole, the defect in this clause is trifling. For the general
adoption of the Geneva rules for use on sea is a step
towards the general adoption of a naval war code. And
with a set of rules to govern war, both on land and sea, we
HeinOnline  -- 1 Colum. L. Rev. 306 1901
THE NA VAL WAR CODE.
shall have advanced a long ways towards that most desirable
goal, the unification of the rules of International Law.
SECTION V.-THE EXERCISE OF THE RIGHT OF SEARCH.
This is confined to properly commissioned vessels of
war, and neutral convoys are exempt from it,
"under escort of vessels of war of their own State * * *
upon proper assurances, based on thorough examination,
from the commander of the convoy."
Here, for the first time, the United States and Great
Britain part company in their practice concerning this
matter. Both have stood out in their prize law against the
continental doctrine that ships under neutral convoy are
exempt from search without a treaty provision to that
effect. Thus, in 1870, the instructions to the French navy
were as follows: " Vous ne visiterez point les bdtiments qui se
trouveront sous le convoi d'un navire de guerre neutre," but in
case of suspicion that the convoying officer has been de-
ceived, he shall make search alone; while Lushington
says: 1
"Vessels under neutral convoy are not on that ground
exempt from visit, search and detention."
The United States had in 1887 ten treaties granting
the right of convoy, that with Italy of 1871, and the rest
with American States; and the political branch of our
Government has long inclined to concede and to claim the
right of convoy. These are the influences which are re-
flected in the code provision. But it may well be doubted
whether as a concession to the neutral it is really valuable.
Hall ends his discussion of the topic as follows: 2
" It cannot but be concluded that the principle of the
exemption of convoyed ships from visit is not embraced
in authoritative international law, and that while its adoption
into it would probably be injurious to belligerents, it is not
likely to be permanently to the advantage of neutrals. It
is fortunate, in view of the collision of opinion which exists
I Sec. 280.
2 Page 68I.
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on the subject, that there is every reason to expect that the
use of convoys will be greatly restricted in the future by the
practical impossibility of uniting in a common body vessels
of very different rates of speed, superior speed having
become an important factor in commercial success."
This section also lays down with much particularity the
way in which a search shall be conducted, following good
usage and the provisions of many of our treaties, to avoid
unduly arousing the susceptibilities and encroaching upon
the powers of that sovereign individual, the merchant
skipper.
SECTION VI.--CONTRABAND OF WAR.
This section well illustrates the clear and simple arrange-
ment of the code. Contraband goods are of two sorts,
those ordinarily used for warlike purposes; those, anci itis
usils, which when destined for specific military use, are also
contraband. Apart from the treaty lists, which are so
common, the code declares that articles conditionally and
unconditionally contraband will be duly and publicly an-
nounced at the outset of a war. Then follows a list of
articles absolutely contraband, which illustrates modern
inventiveness, and this smaller list of conditionally con.
traband :
" Coal when destined for a naval station, a port of call,
or a ship or ships of the enemy; materials for the con-
struction of railways or telegraphs; and money when such
materials or money are destined for the enemy's forces;
provisions when actually destined for the enemy's military
or naval forces."
That coal, money and provisions may, under certain
circumstances, be contraband, is the law as British and
American writers, courts and naval officers understand it.
But France and Russia deny any occasional contraband
character to coal. The phrase, "actually destined for the
enemy's military or naval use," is very similar to the lan-
guage of the Supreme Court in the Commercen' which
declared provisions contraband when "destined for the
army or navy of the enemy, or for his ports of naval
I i Wheat. 382.
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or military equipment." A mere hostile destination, then,
is not enough to give provisions a contraband character,
and several writers of repute, Wheaton and Hall, for in-
stance, think that they should be bound for a place actually
invested or blockaded, which was the contention of the
United States Government in 1793, when England seized
American provisions destined for all'French ports. This is
also the continental doctrine. Great Britain objected in
1885 when France, in conflict with China, made rice, bound
for open Chinese ports, contraband. And the United States
again protested, when provisions for the Portuguese port
of Lorenzo Marques, but probably destined for Boer con-
sumption, were seized by British cruisers; and the practice
was stopped. Thus our code follows the decisions of the
British and American courts, while all governments try to
secure the widest commercial liberty possible for their
citizens.
SECTION VII.-BLOCKADE.
The laws of blockade in general do not involve much
that is disputable, and the code treatment of this import-
ant topic is adequate and good. Thirty days are allowed
for neutral ships to load and leave a blockaded port. If
intent to break blockade can be shown, liability to capture
attaches from the very outset of the voyage. The crews
of blockade runners are not lawfully prisoners, but certain
of them may be detained as witnesses before the Prize
Court. These three rules all recall our own usage as
worked out in the Civil War.
The final section, IX, allows the naval commander to
conclude a truce or capitulation With the enemy, limited
strictly to his own force. With the nearest cable cut, and
his departmental head some thousands of miles away, he
needs wide powers and can be trusted with them. On the
other hand, a general armistice is solely a governmental
act.
"Acts of war, done after the receipt of the official notice
of the conclusion of a treaty of peace or of an armistice, are
null and void."
It might have been added that acts of I war, done after
the conclusion of a truce or peace, but before the news of
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it had reached the distant combatants, must be undone or
compensated for as far as possible. It will be remembered
that the fall of Manila took place after the signature of the
protocol, which served as a basis for the treaty of peace
with Spain, but before news of it reached the Philippines.
On this ground, at Paris, the legality of the capture of
Manila was contested. But as the protocol itself sur-
rendered the city subject to future disposal, the question
was not a vital one.
A few general remarks may properly bring this com-
mentary to an end.
The Admiralty Courts of the United States have
naturally followed British rather than foreign decisions in
prize cases. On the other hand, the 'national policy, being
that of a State usually peaceful and neutral, has in many
respects adhered to continental doctrine. These two tend-
encies have caused an occasional want of harmony between
two branches of the Government, both of which are
influential in the shaping of our rules of naval capture.
This code accordingly reflects both, but subject, neverthe-
less, as its final article (55) declares, "to all laws and
treaties of the United States that are now in force, or may
hereafter be established."
And so one detects in it now a bit of navy prejudice,
now a bit of government policy, and now the influence of a
Supreme Court decision. But including all, above all, it
purports to be the accepted rules of the International Law
of to-day. As such it is to be judged, academically now,
practically in future war. And my judgment is altogether
favorable. As a compilation and interpretation of the law
for the guidance of the navy, it is modern, clear, enlightened
and rational, a credit to the department which issues it, and
to the gentleman whose name it bears.
THEODORE S. WOOLSEY.
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